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Abstract. As a legal philosophical overview of the operation of European law, the paper 
aims at describing the mentality working in it by also answering the query whether the 
European law itself is to be regarded as the extension of some domestic laws or it offers quite 
a new and sui generis structure built upon all member states’ laws. In either option, the 
connection between the European law and the composing national laws recalls the embodiment 
of post modern clichés, as the former’s actual working (both purposefully and through its 
by-effects) exerts a destructive impact upon the bounds once erected by the latter’s 
anchorage in the traditions of legal positivism. In addition, the excellence in efficacious 
operation of the European law is achieved by transposing the control on its central enactments 
to autonomous implementation and jurisdiction by its member nations. According to the 
conclusions of the paper, (1) the (post) positivism as the traditional domestic juristic outlook 
is inappropriate to any adequate investigation of the reality of European law. As part of the 
global post modernism itself, the European law stems from a kind of artificial reality 
construction (as the attempted materialisation of its own virtuality), which is from the outset 
freed from the captivity of both historical particularities and human experience, i.e., of anything 
concretely given hic et nunc. At the same time, (2) by its operation the European law 
dynamises large structures, through which it makes to move that what is chaos itself. For it is 
the reconstructive human intent solely that may try to arrange its outcome according to 
some ideal of order posteriorly–without, however, the operation itself (forming its construct 
and assuring its daily management) striving for anything of order (or ordered state and 
systemicity). This is the way in which the European law can be an adequate reflection upon 
the (macro) economic basis to which it forms the superstructure. Accordingly, (3) the whole 
construct is frameworked (i.e., integrated into one working unit and also mobilised) by an 
artificially animated dynamism. Concludingly, no national interest can be asserted in it 
without successful national self-positioning ready to launch it. 
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1. Introduction: Queries in European and Global Perspectives 
 
As far as challenges are concerned to find what place may Hungary occupy with 
her law and legal culture in the European Union after her accession to member-
ship is concluded, first of all it seems to be suitable to trying to foresee the 
future in mirror of the development from recent past to the present, through a 
comparative historical analysis. 
 In accordance with this, the first item to examine is the foundational issue 
of the ways in which the European Union’s common law issued uniformly to 
all its members, its administrative implementation under the promise of some 
well-balanced and co-ordinated uniformity, as well as its judicial application 
by its central law-adjudication agencies will be in the position to exert a decisive 
impact on either the long-term survival or the gradual withering away of the 
historical specificities and relative independence of the national legal systems 
involved. Or, as seen from the opposite side, the dilemma of partner states is 
in what exactly and to what extent this law of the European Union may become 
a genuinely and truly sui generis formation indeed. Otherwise formulated, how 
much its creation, administrative implementation and judicial ascertainment 
with feasible adaptation are to become captive of the giant partners fighting 
with one another within the Union to extend their respective (national) influence 
to the rest, in order that the English, German and/or French domestic traditions 
can eventually be transformed into one single all-European scheme. All this 
covers the prospects of standing divergence versus final convergence of the 
(continental) Civil Law and the (Anglo-Saxon) Common Law mentalities; the 
selection of the models for, as well as the techniques and future chances of, the 
common codification of European (private substantive and procedural, and further 
on) laws; the definition of the pattern(s) followed in law-adjudication exercised 
by the common judicial fora of Europe; and, altogether and taken as a basis, the 
mapping out of both the legal traditions of the participating states by delineating 
their historical groups and sub-groups (with past and present co-relations and 
changes of shift thereof) and of their chances of either ultimate preservation 
or perhaps sublation–in the process of and despite their continual self-adapting 
transformation, in the first place as to their respective sources of the law, their 
conceptuality, structure and problem sensitivity, as well as the techniques and 
judicial reasoning they use, including its canonised skills as well. 
 Such dealing with the above, if exhausted by filling up similar frames 
exclusively, would appear as suggesting some self-offer for servile copying, 
albeit the way open for all new-comers is by far not of one-sense in principle. 
For as members of equal standing by now, we cannot take as simply given 
from the beginning that, just as a token and independently of us as actors 
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(destined merely to watch the scene from a distance), in the Union’s womb 
and through its complex chain-movement, law is getting continuously formed 
addressing us, too; while it is not to be taken as a self-propelling cause either 
that from all this some definite modification and continued change of respective 
domestic laws will ensue as the former’s simple extension or mechanical 
conclusion, as in some reflex automatism. Or, just two-sensed and therefore 
also mutual and multi-actored this way is. Accordingly, the opposite pole of 
why to investigate effects will exactly be the issue, whether or not there are 
skills and chances hidden in our traditions, institutionalisations, particular 
solutions, experiences, or even practices of pressurisation, through the coming 
activation of which we can also assert our own interests within–and by con-
tributing to–the European Union’s common thought and institutional action 
in a truly creative manner and without disrespect to its overall ideality and 
functional complexity. 
 At the same time, we had better to be aware of the fact that we actually 
take part in the above mechanism of mutual influencing by far not exclusively 
with consciously pre-planned steps and patterns. For there is a brute fact, namely, 
the one of our relative Central & Eastern European impotence resulting from our 
specific historical conditions. For the region’s Communist past, which spanned 
over nearly half a century to detach it from the daily Western European and 
Atlantic routine, has driven all those concerned to forced paths, diverting them 
from the very chance of any organic development. Or, this past made own 
practices developed and enforced throughout the West, against which we, 
Hungarians, for example, may now call back our own historical (and partly 
also nostalgic) remembrances (to former efforts at state-building, bourgeois 
revolution, liberal governance up to our involvement in the First World War, 
struggles between the two world wars, or, lastly, republican foundations 
during the short coalition period after the second worldwide catastrophe) at the 
most, which, however, inevitably and in the strictest sense, had also cut us off 
from contemporary Western European and Atlantic practices developed in their 
after-war recovery and afterwards, by having transformed our traditions into a 
historical fore pattern anchoring in their already distant past. That is, our 
ideals became in the meantime dated as mere remembrances rooted in the very 
past of Western civilisational patterns, forbidden and denied for us at their 
time, while we could hardly get own experience from their daily practices, 
evolved with them through nearly half a century. Therefore, eventually and in the 
last analysis, in both facts and ideals we are in a remarkable phase delay. For 
this very reason, the issue is also bound to be raised how much will our overall 
heritage–nolens, volens–affect our near future as an in-built impetus given. 
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 Based upon own potentials, we are already both new members and constituent 
parts of–with shared ability also to contribute to–this unifying Europe. There-
fore we are expected to answer the query for sustainability in a sensitive manner, 
namely, to rate what kind of future can be prognosticated for us in the dilemma 
of preservation mixed by mutual influences or assimilation under the pressure 
of overweighty partners, and also what kind of role traditions historically 
evolved may play in forming all this, defining its basic directions while 
transforming themselves into a conservative antipode in control of current 
adaptations, as main factors to strengthen internal forces needed so much for 
facing current challenges effectively and in an adequate manner. 
 Of course, plenty of researches have been carried out in Western Europe 
concerning various aspects of such and similar topics, even if in a rather 
isolated contexture. Neither panorama nor developmental perspective has been 
offered by them till now. As series of analyses within the reach of positive law 
and closed down in its well-established theoretical framework, they have been 
mostly building on their prevailing outlook as some ready-made recipe, without 
sensing the paradigmatic novelty of the total move which is going on anyway 
now with universal historical significance. Consequently, in want of own 
conceptualisation and methodological foundation, they have simply extended 
(insufficiently and by far not adequately, by the way) that what is anyhow 
prevalent as given in their everyday domestic routine. And still, own partici-
pation with own abilities necessitates own answers, specific of own challenges, 
as has ever been used in–and in a manner worth of–social sciences. 
 
 
2. Basic Issues 
 
2.1. Human Refinement 
 
The European integration is one of the greatest victories of centuries, perhaps 
of millennia, as a development that may predestinate the mankind’s overall 
fate for a long period of time. For such an institutionalisation of channels of 
international collaboration on a voluntary basis and launched in every step by 
co-operative participation is a hardly overvaluable advance in the homo 
sapiens’ history. It is to note that not more than ten generations divide us from 
feudal particularism only, which presumed continuous group-fight with altering 
chances. It might result in some profit for occasional winners but it caused 
mostly lost (if not plain destruction) for nations and states concerned. In huge 
regions of the West of Europe where enemy in the proper sense (i.e., external 
power threatening our commonly shared civilisational values) had never menaced 
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survival, mostly also Christian princes, overlords sworn to the same God hankered 
for, or borne a grudge against, the property of their similia. Castles undamaged 
we admire in the Western hemisphere today as historical monuments are 
furnished with all imaginable defensive arts against those (yesterday perhaps 
still friend and fellow-in-arms neighbour) rounding on our life, property, spouse, 
and power equally, while we know that eventually no human artifice can save 
anyone arrived to the top on earth against the intrigue of others, aspiring with 
the same fighting spirit to the same arrival. Well, we may wonder at our still 
prehistory of a nearly recent past, how the refinement–or self-ennoblement–of 
human race proved to be relative for long centuries: scarcely less than two 
millennia later that the message of Christianity (in company of other world 
religions transmitting legacies basically concordant with the above) had become 
the common language of our predecessors.1 
 Coming nearer to our present, just a bit more than half a dozen of generations’ 
period separate us from the age when by force of his arms Napoleon aspired to 
found a Europe-like empire, and our parents still might live red, then brawn 
and yellow dictatorships that made efforts to form global empiredoms by mere 
power. In history, the borders of causalities and coincidences often grow dim, 
since in a stage of constant and mutual expansion–in a modern state of bellum 
omnium contra omnes, later in variations of waging warfare and concluding 
peace treaties (making place to one another in a forecalculable sequence), and, 
as the achievement of our modernity, hardly cramped by the so-called inter-
national law either then or since then–every state actor experiments with 
optimising its situation legally, by setting in sheer power techniques and by 
making a defensive ideology out of its actually followed practice alike (putting 
it as a troubling issue to the posterity whether or not in the final analysis the 
catch words of the Christianity, ruled by the Church’s adopted politics, or, 
later on, the ones of democracy–that is, the attention to be paid to and by the 
public opinion–had been confined to this); and, with the wisdom of posterity 
at the most and with no little resignation–most of all post festam–we take 
notice of the fact that, with some variations in resemblance but still coming 
from common descendence, the same spirit of the age has materialised in one 
  
 1 It is worthwile recalling the fact that sociological essays are used to report about re-
feudalisation as a still strangely viable phenomenon also in Europe, in the very periphery 
of the European Union, whose stage of development is described most adequately in terms 
of Pierre Corneille’s drama El Cid, reminding of the Iberian states during the 11th to the 
13th centuries. Cf., e.g., Shlapentokh, V.: Russia. Privatization and Illegalization of Social 
and Political Life. Michigan State University, 1995.  
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of them and perhaps also in the other, maybe coming out as the winner of the 
given conflict. 
 Notwithstanding all this, it was in such a confrontation among nations that 
international law began to regain new strengths (together with its immensely 
considerable and varied professional branchings off by today), in line with and 
also resulting in the proliferation of international organisations, which were some-
times destined to become straightforwardly a legally circumscribed world state 
substitute, sometimes established to fulfil strictly delimited duties, considered 
as necessary; however, they had a common mark in that they were given a 
particular–and sui generis–legal status. Today’s American hegemony has formed 
in the same way, in the world-wide interaction of giving and receiving, using 
all available potentials as defined by the actual challenge and the desirable 
response, which recontextualises also international law in a new paradigmatic 
situation.2 Today this direction is coupled–if not identified with the former in 
its entirety, despite numerous interlocking it has–with the trend of globalisation, 
basically revolving around a world-economic interest. Filled with the taste of 
progressing in progress and bearing the purifying and self-recreating effect of 
the Enlightenment, not even these times might we answer otherwise the question 
once formulated by the Academy of Dijon, calling the farsighted vision of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau about the ennoblement of morals, than by saying that: 
our instruments are constantly refined–although, and with returning generality, 
endeavours striving to reach the end have in the meantime become still more 
implacable, in result-maximalisation more inconsiderate, because by being 
capable of setting more refined technologies, they may envision a still by far 
more total effect. 
 What and how will be precipitated in our legal thinking and in our theori-
sation on law from all this? According to the shortest reply: much and little at 
the same time. Theoretical reflection seems to be always retarded. This is as if 
our earlier conditions were too forceful, since the possibilities within the prevailing 
frameworks are almost limitlessly able to pursue the old paths undisturbed, by 
adapting the known ones, and open for cautious developments. Nearly this is 
what we can learn from explorations into the historical logic of scientific 
  
 2 Gooding, R. E.: Toward an International Rule of Law: Distinguishing International 
Law-breakers from Would-be Law-makers. The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005) 225–246 raises 
the straightforward issue that the claim of »rule of law, not of men« formulated within a 
state has been changed to »rule of law, not of states« in relations among states (227); 
however, in case of the overdominance by a superpower rosen there is hardly any guarantee 
for voluntary and one-sided moderation–beyond the hope that international co-operation 
will be effective enough to “really internalize the settled rules governing relations between 
»civilized nations«.” (229). 
  LEGAL THEORISING 421 
  
development. Namely, advance is carried on within the frame of paradigms 
already formed; theorising upon new recognitions is achieved by gradually 
dissolving the tensions which are faced in this body of knowledge undertaken 
unchanged from the earlier period, and, this way, also mitigating them in 
consideration of its future; and it is only somewhen, at certain historically 
exceptional periods, that all this may turn to be over the limits of tolerability–
moreover, most frequently not even as the necessary effect of circumstances 
that cannot be explained otherwise in epistemology than as the issue generated 
by trout-fly, secondary, merely coincident phenomena, or by external forces, or 
after a chance of breaking through is recognised–when, perhaps, a new paradigm 
will be born.3 
 Moreover, in law, the practicing of and theorisation on which is unchangedly 
cultivated mostly as closed within state boundaries and predisposed of the own 
cultural inveteracy, we ourselves seldom become cloven and duplex. Instead, 
we expand rather our suitable practices and habits to new territories–simulta-
neously as test and experiment–for that we may carry on chasing what is already 
well-known (by its further analytical exploration, synthetic re-definition in 
larger contexts, as well as reaffirmation in extrapolations), proceeding on on 
ways that are made safe thereby. It is in this sense that the present haunts. For 
we are inclined to see pretence, opportunity, and new experiment of extending 
ourselves–our past and experience–in this new European reality, rather than 
trying to sense, recognise and theorise it as a sui generis actuality, with both 
readiness measured by and approach adequate to it. 
 
2.2. The Westphalian Heritage of State Law and International Law 
 
Anyway, there is some implicitness dominating our jurisprudential thought, 
functioning as sieves of professional socialisation, on the one hand, and as the 
filtering agent of verification, on the other. It may serve as an aggregate of 
habitual criteria on both sides of the input and the output, defining primarily 
what can be thought of law. 
 For us, interestingly here and now, such implicitness is forwarded first of 
all by taking the so-called Westphalian duo–that is, dividing up the law’s 
world to nation-states, ruled by domestic regimes, on the one hand, and inter-
national law, serving as the governing principle amongst such states, on the 
  
 3 Kuhn, Th. S.: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, 1962; cf. also vom 
Dietze, E.: Paradigms Explained. Rethinking Thomas Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science. 
Westport, Conn. 2001 & Marcum, J. A.: Thomas Kuhn’s Revolution. An Historical 
Philosophy of Science, London–New York, 2005. 
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other–as a basis. In conformity with the latter’s underlying origin, nature and 
operation (despite huge efforts anyway), international law is until today pulpy 
and fluid, rugged in all its components as forming day to day, since due to its 
occasionality and weakness in centralisation, it is not summed in reliably 
comprehensive and completed doctrine.4 This is why now–à propos the “inter-
national rule of law”–great feelings of its defect are formulated, recognising 
the need of determined steps to overcome it through various forms of promotion.5 
Since it is a common experience that as soon as international power balance is 
split (by the practical dissolution of the League of Nations in the late interwar 
period or the end of bipolarity after the fall of the Soviet Union now), 
hegemonic interest is to prevail again (visibly vis-à-vis others),6 as backed by 
the standing and well-known celestial solemnity of references made to superb 
and unchanging principles. 
 In turn, national laws are used to be seen in the duality of the continental 
Civil Law and the Anglo-American Common Law (or, in triality, as complemented 
to by the so-called mixed regimes), when their established technicalities, 
institutional networks, or firm foundations in basically developed doctrines (or 
doctrinal outlines) are considered. Here and now, it is not their actuality that 
may be seen as problematic but their unproblematic reception as something 
given from the outset as an exclusive natural fact. For it has some imperialistic 
undertone when the process of ongoing globalisation, sheltering behind all 
present moves, is also taken into account; when it ignores the broadening of 
the topics of investigations devoted to social formalisms by social theories since 
the beginning of the 20th century; when it features up the standing imprints of 
Euro-centrism or ethno-centrisms. Since the epoch of Eugen Ehrlich and Max 
Weber, so-called non-state laws as well as the cases of legal pluralisms, deriving 
from some parallel and/or concurring predominance, have also called the 
undivided attention of jurisprudential (legal sociological and anthropological) 
research.7 Or, when we are invariably footed in the so-called Western Law, we 
  
 4 Nevertheless, for its demand, see, e.g., Jääskinen, N.: Back to the Begriffshimmel? 
A Plea for an Analytical Perspective in European Law. In: Prechal, S.–van Roermund, B. 
(eds.): The Coherence of EU Law. The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts. Oxford–
New York, 2008, 451–461.  
 5 Cf., e.g., Koskenniemi, M.: The Politics of International Law. European Journal of 
International Law (1990) 4–32. 
 6 Cf., e.g., as a cry out, by Phelan, D. R.: It’s God we ought to Crucify. Fiesole, 1992.  
 7 For basic issues related, cf., by the author: Jogelmélet – jogi néprajz, avagy a nép-
szokásvizsgálatok teoretikus hozadéka [Theory of law–legal ethnography, or the theoretical 
fruits of investigations into legally relevant folkways]. Társadalomkutatás 26 (2008) 3, 
275–298 & <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/v778k4q3p4061h56/fulltext.pdf>. 
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are tempted to attribute low relevant significance to legal traditions far from us 
and named simply as “others”, lived and living almost undisturbedly in the 
greater part of our globe, that is, to traditions which we consider mostly as 
parts of their religion but which are often the indistinguishable and by far not 
definitely unsuccessful parts of a comprehensive world-outlook, working well 
in their own traditional environment and medium. And this narrow-minded 
focus may have proved to be persistent with us at a time when we actually 
have not yet developed any truly general or, in the strict sense of the word, 
universal legal theory8–unless we count as such with such caricatures as 
afforded by Kelsen’s positivism (as to a European continental version), or the 
analytical trend (as to the British pattern), in addition to (as the historical 
predecessor of all jurisprudence ever undertaken) the catholicos claim for 
universality as offered by the philosophy of natural law. 
 
2.3. The Place of European Law 
 
Where can one find the place of European law? For that what may be seen 
from the representations of European legal literature as a synthesis is of quite 
uncertain contours without theoretical message, even if spiced with historico-
political arguments occasionally, mostly covering or substituting to national 
interest pressed. Even in monographies the cacophony of incidental remarks can 
only assure some perspective, namely, from outside. The nationally diversified 
normative stuff will remain separated, perhaps with the sole exception of doctrinal 
propositions to prepare some common codes of the European Union. They, in 
turn, seem to reincarnate the idea having once prevailed in conceptual juris-
prudence,9 with abstract notionality defined within an established systemicity 
that is backed by the professionally shared belief in the creative force of 
human rationality. This is completed by the hope that constructions thusly 
gained will embody final rationality. 
 We can perhaps get a more sensitive picture by also counting with the fact 
that „Forging a legal Europe and post modernism are just complementary to 
one another.”10 For in this case, too, the multiple mediations through which the 
  
 8 As a demand for it, cf., by the author: Összehasonlító módszer és jogelmélet 
[Comparative method and legal theory]. [1973] In: Útkeresés. Kísérletek – kéziratban [The 
search for a path: unpublished manuscripts]. Budapest, 2001, 97–101. 
 9 Cf., by the author: Leibniz und die Frage der rechtlichen Systembildung. In: 
Mollnau, K. A. (Hrsg.): Materialismus und Idealismus im Rechtsdenken. Geschichte und 
Gegenwart. Stuttgart, Wiesbaden 1987, 143–121. 
 10 Arnaud, A.-J.: Pour une pensée juridique européenne. Paris, 1991. 300. [„Élaboration 
d’un Europe juridique et post-modernisme vont de pair.”] 
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formalisms in the operation of European institutions are filtered–with priority 
guaranteed to common institutional manifestations (directives and decisions) 
while, on the other end of the operational mechanism, a through and through 
filtration will be achieved by the national agent interpreting all these (just 
enabling us to conclude that, after all, neither “supranational monism” nor 
„centrality of domestic law” taken separately but a compromise reached by 
both simultaneously shall prevail11)–push us back from the illusory hope of 
certainty to the mere facticity of uncertainty. 
 From the perspective of methodological thinking, we may perceive the 
same transformation process already realised in social sciences at an early stage 
of the 20th century, when the notional purity of rule- or statutory positivisms was 
corroded by sociologisms also entering the field, that is, by the positivism of 
facts.12 Nurtured by earlier expectations (and not without firm grounds), all this 
had first imprinted minds with the fear of genuine anarchy; getting gradually 
replaced by a functionalist view of society, which could only take a more or 
less solid theoretical form after long debates on the issue of priority and 
attempts at final subjection, by the second half of the century. On its turn, this 
new concept was from the beginning based on plural actors and the endless 
series of social interactions, changing the mythical definitivum of some primary 
act, or creative intervention and final determination, to the functional inter-
dependence of partial complexes in actual co-operation. This has resulted in 
the dissolution of legal positivism13 while arriving at a new, relatively well-
balanced state.14 
  
 11 La Torre, M.: Legal Pluralism as Evolutionary Achievement of Community Law. 
Ratio Juris, 12 (1999) 2, 182–195 on 192. 
 12 For the debate in Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie during the years 1916 and 
1917, see Paulson, S. L. (ed.): Hans Kelsen und die Rechtssoziologie. Auseinandersetzungen 
mit Hermann U. Kantorowicz, Eugen Ehrlich und Max Weber. Aalen, 1993. 
 13 Cf., e.g., by the author: What is to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates 
Revolving around the Topic of ‘The Judicial Establishment of Facts’. In: Atienza, M.–
Pattaro, E.–Schulte, M.–Topornin, B.–Wyduckel, D. (eds.): Theorie des Rechts und der 
Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Werner Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin, 2003, 657–676 
and–exemplifying the positivism’s dissolution in a case-study–Meeting Points between 
the Traditions of English–American Common Law and Continental-French Civil Law 
(Developments and Experience of Postmodernity in Canada). Acta Juridica Hungarica 
44 (2003) 21–44 & <http://www.akademiai.com/content/x39m7w437134167l/?p= 
056215b52c56447c8f9631a8d8baada3&pi=1>. 
 14 Cf., by the author: Macrosociological Theories of Law: From the ‘Lawyer’s World 
Concept’ to a Social Science Conception of Law. In: Kamenka, E.–Summers R. S.–Twining, 
W. (eds.): Soziologische Jurisprudenz und realistische Theorien des Rechts. Berlin, 1986, 
197–215. 
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 Once the certainty of all the uncertainties inherent in the state of post 
modernism is reflected upon the complex of European law, one can reach 
some points of orientation. First of all there is a striking common experience 
in that everything even in a loose connection to it seems to have been permeated 
by a kind of “missionary zeal”.15 This is characterised by both its weigh and 
extraordinarity, formative of the future of European history, and the fact that it 
lacks any strictly circumscribable subject. For today “a reactive, event-driven and 
context-dependent approach to EU legal studies” is the mainstream,16 considering 
the fact that the “European Community law represents more evidently perhaps 
than most other subjects an intricate web of politics, economics and law. It 
virtually calls out to be understood by [...] an interdisciplinary, contextual or 
critical approach.”17 
 The medium itself in the womb of which all this is to happen is the fluid 
state of ceaseless being something and becoming something else as well, since 
“The EU, after all, is a polity in the making”.18 The European law as it is at 
any given time is the first of those factors shaping the commonness in Europe 
at any time; and what is known presently as the European Union is the prime 
factor to form the European law–in an interdependence and with a mutually 
conditioning force that, beyond the dynamics of their mutual effects and self-
sustaining output, there is almost no fix(ed) point to relate to them in the 
manner of Archimedes. Therefore one may state it without sheerly rhetorical 
overestimation reaching a dead-end that “there is simply no single answer to 
questions such as: what is the legal constitutional nature of the EU, and what 
is the role of the law in the governance of the EU?”19 For all this is about the 
specificity of the European law’s ontological nature and its self-determination 
through the mutual definition of the forces working in its just-so-being. Just in 
the way as the European law’s criterial component “conditionality attached to 
supremacy is not a temporary aberration, but a permanent feature of the EU 
constitutional order.”20–since it is also to show those apparently (self-)contradic-
tory features that can at all be interpreted within the dynamism of the total 
  
 15 Walker, N.: Legal Theory and the European Union: A 25th Anniversary Essay. 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 25 (2005) 481–601 at 586. 
 16 Ibid., 583. 
 17 The first time by Snyder, F.: New Directions in European Community Law. Journal 
of Law and Society, 14 (1987) 167–182 on 167. 
 18 Hunt, J.–Shaw, J.: Fairy Tale of Luxembourg? Reflections on Law and Legal Scholar-
ship in European Integration in <http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:F42D5KPUYG8J: 
www.sheffield.ac.uk/content/1/c6/06/90/87/Hunt%2>, 5. 
 19 Ibid., 21. 
 20 Ibid., 14. 
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whole, taken as a process. Even the constitutional foundations of its structure 
can be best described in the enigmatic but reliable language of legal and 
political philosophy–in the way, for instance, that the relationship between the 
Union and the domestic national orders is “pluralistic rather than monistic, and 
interactive rather than hierarchical”.21 
 In the evergreen polemics of legal theory whether it is the rule that makes the 
law (as suggested by the transformation of regola into rules with the ancient 
Romans and by the axiomatic conceptualisation in early modern continental 
Europe) or the law’s presence, with the quality of juridicity, will only be 
revealed through the judicial event (as ever professed by the experimental 
pragmatism of the Anglo-Saxon wisdom), there is a new contribution to the 
underlying issue by the conclusion, maybe shocking for the first time, according 
to which “The European Union’s legal system has become the most effective 
international legal system in existence, standing in clear contrast to the typical 
weakness of international law and international courts.” For all this is nothing 
but the outcome of the fact that in the political processes of the European 
Union the European Court(s) of Justice and the national courts have become 
co-actors in imposing a common will, called European law, on the governments 
of member states.22 
 
 
3. Analogies 
 
3.1. Solar System with Planets 
 
There is a methodologically inspiring symbolic expression provided by the 
metaphor of “solar system with planets”, based on the various forms of 
interaction and interdependence between the intellectual tradition embodied by 
the ius commune as the once European jurisprudents’ law, on the one hand, 
and its local applications, on the other. According to a learned author, “Manlio 
Bellomo–L’Europa del diritto commune 6th ed. (Roma: 1993) 205-206–has used 
the imagery of the Ius commune as the sun and the iura propria, the legal 
norms of kingdoms, principalities, and city states as the planets to explain the 
relationship of the Ius commune and iura propria. The metaphor is perceptive 
and accurate. The sun is not an inert mass, without energy or gravity that does 
  
 21 MacCormick, N.: Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State, and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth. Oxford–New York, 1999. 
 22 Alter, K. J.: Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an 
International Rule of Law in Europe. Oxford–New York, 2001. 
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not exercise any influence on the planets. To describe the sun as a great 
theoretical star in the sky that has no real life or influence of its own would be 
silly. On the other hand, the planets have their own conditions, forces, norms 
that regulate their self-contained worlds. Each planet has a different set of rules, 
but each is affected in different ways and from a different distance by the energy 
of the sun. No planet would reject the sun; it would be folly and unthinkable. 
The result would be chaos for the planet’s system. My conclusions can be 
stated succinctly: The Ius commune was not bookish law, was not the law of 
the greats, to be read, savored, and returned to the shelf, was not learned law 
in contrast to real law. It was the cauldron from which all European legal 
systems emerged.”23 
 Such a metaphor, I guess, can serve as a convincing analogy to describe 
the simultaneously centrifugal and centripetal, unending moves characteristic 
of the cases of legal pluralism, and most of all, the actualisation/implementation 
of the European law as unity in principle, showing certain diversity of practice 
at the same time. Otherwise expressed, this means that once some depth is 
actually reached by the process of European integration, there will also be some 
inertia and gravitational force in work as well, which may ensure that its law, 
independently of how it operates in fact, will also be able to exert its continued 
impact, feeding back, of course, the challenges it is to respond to, even if mostly 
in a rather indirect manner. 
 As it will be cleared up in the following paragraphs in more details, it is 
the pluri-directional move by plural actors (with the overwhelmingly massive 
force that is to be formed anyhow in the womb of such movements) that will 
specify the particularity of the operation of European law. 
 
3.2. Pre-modernity, Modernity, Post-modernity 
 
The amalgam that the operation of the European Union is, exhibits a variety of 
features ranging from premodern, through modern, to postmodern. 
 Premodern, insofar as it genuinely reverberates with echoes of the ius 
commune tradition. 
 Yet, at the same time, European law exhibits features of modernity as well. 
It carries on with the tradition of legal positivism, yet at the same time, we 
recognise the process of the classic nation-state being transposed rigidly into 
the rather different setting of the succeeding new age, in tandem perhaps with 
  
 23 Pennington, K.: Learned Law, Droit Savant, Gelehrtes Recht: The Tyranny of a 
Concept. Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, 20 (1994), 205–215 & 
<http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/learned.htm>. 
428 CSABA VARGA 
  
the potential stigmas attached to being out of date, and showing signs of being 
artificially produced–a result of the forceful nature of the process. Efforts and 
attempts aimed at producing European common law have thus far been located 
along more or less exclusive codification strategies, and have attributed primacy 
to the systemic idea,24 and subscribe to the notion of law being susceptible to 
being fixed in a chosen form onto the skeletal structure provided by the formulae 
of rules. 
 Additionally, the air of postmodernity also permeates this sphere. This 
becomes tangible through the way the innumerable directives (that are not only 
capable of creating internal tensions among one another, but even of completely 
cancelling the effects of each other) are to practically overwrite the body of 
rules comprising European law. The fundamental cause of this reversal is that 
these rules are only enforceable through actualisation by the courts, that is, 
via adjudication governed by value judgments and the weighing of conflicting 
interests, which are essentially authoritative proclamations produced in decision-
making scenarios. 
 This is a postmodern construct, accepting the primacy of principles over 
rules to the extent that, for example, the equality of languages natively dissolves 
in the cacophony of regulations that which (although in and of itself can be 
perceived as merely text) may nevertheless no longer be monocultural even in 
its simple textuality, since it is floating above the individual culture specific 
languages of all member states. Also to the extent that the community actions 
are–intentionally, due to one of the most fundamental principles determining 
the nature of this construct–subjugated to the various specific interpretations 
(arbitrary choices) produced by member states based either on powers afforded 
by a status of local autonomy or other powers exclusive to the given juris-
diction. Also to the extent that, by extending the freedom of the choice of the 
law, it gives rise to the coexistence of competing national forums, which 
combined with the freedom of contract and of enterprise ultimately gives way 
to a certain favoured legal system (or systems) gaining monopoly status along 
with the other (or others) becoming hollow from a practical perspective (since 
even their remaining degree of sovereignty is thusly rendered inconsequential). 
In other words, also to the extent that although the powers of the national (as 
in member state) entities are theoretically preserved, nevertheless, in the practical 
realm, a continent-wide globalisation has (already) been put into motion by 
practically almost fully liberalising the marketplace of initiatives and allowing 
freedom of choice among the various relevant legal regulations. Consequently, 
  
 24 For their variegated adventure, cf., by the author: Codification as a Socio-historical 
Phenomenon. Budapest, 1991. 
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the potential outcome of this process could be that in fact the status of the state 
may soon become largely nominal indeed–because of the freedom of enterprise 
and of commerce. The reason for this is that in the case of giant commercial 
enterprises comprised of freely constructed concentrations of influence that 
are the most successful in the battle to acquire the largest market share, the de 
facto force upholding order increasingly resides with the players themselves, 
as their legal agreements tend to designate as arbitrators of their potential legal 
wrangling certain agencies commissioned to act as forums producing rulings 
on their disagreements. When the relevant provisions are composed with an 
appropriate level of sophistication, it is even possible to create a legal construct, 
whereby even the courts of the European Union may end up having a rather 
limited practical influence over these paralegal or non-legal procedures. 
 
 
4. The Structural Pattern of the European Law 
 
4.1. Legal Culture of the European Union 
 
Well, using a multi-tiered image of the potential wholeness of law,25 it is 
possible to distinguish three different layers: 
 
law 
surface level 
(legal rules, case law, etc.) 
legal culture 
(legal concepts, general principles, lawyer’s 
methodology) 
deep structure 
 
and strange as it may sound, our conclusion is that so far the legal setup of 
the European Union appears to have reached only the first level.26 To put it 
differently, the culture and core structure of European law, i.e., its conceptual, 
theoretical, and methodological assets, and its doctrine (in the sense of a 
  
 25 Tuori, K.: EC Law: An Independent Legal Order or a Post-modern Jack-in-the-Box? 
In: Erikson, L. D. et al. (eds.): Dialectic of Law and Reality. Readings in Finnish Legal 
Theory. Helsinki, 1999, 397–415 at 403. 
 26 Wilhelmsson, Th.: Jack-in-the-Box Theory of European Community Law. In: 
Dialectic of Law… op. cit. 437–454 at 449. 
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Rechtsdogmatik) have not been fully formulated, its wholeness has not been 
attained by far. 
 Truly, that which is commonly referred to as the objectification of law27 
has been present for quite a long time, and it has materialised in the form of a 
solid amalgam block of a rather chaotic composition. The contracts concluded with 
the European Union, the directives and other positive sources of law emanating 
from the representative and governmental bodies representing the European 
Union, furthermore, the corpus of its own juridical rulings–beyond the transposed 
and adopted elements, i.e., in addition to the body of acquis–has objectified 
the law. Nonetheless, to this day no palpable certainty or generality has evolved 
out of this: neither do we see an already crystallised form of legal conceptuali-
sation, nor do we notice a strategic construction happening along a set of principles 
producing a balanced construct, and even whatever could be understood as being 
a more-or-less consensual methodology is lacking from the process.28 And 
certainly, in the absence of all of these obviously no genuine doctrine exists, 
unless we consider this term to cover even those compendia released by authors 
(which are subject to being revised or rewritten with perhaps daily frequency), 
that seem to report every single development structured in whatever form of a 
grouping, and which tend to be rather void of genuine thought regardless of 
being produced under the guise of bona fide science. 
 Still, the stuff comprised of accumulated normative materials resembles at 
best–even with the best of intentions–the critical mass produced by the layers 
of deposits formed on top of each other left behind by a long tradition of Anglo-
Saxon case-law. So it resembles an incomprehensible heap that can only be 
penetrated via the use of some method of creating subgroupings based on 
typification, which then has the effect of reducing the apparently inherent, 
native chaos. This can be achieved by identifying certain precedent-blocks that 
do in fact exhibit truly significant differentiating features when examined from 
a specific perspective; yet we are well advised to keep in mind that no one 
such structural construct should be considered absolute or exclusively valid in 
its given form, nor is it in any way predestinated, because using a different set 
of principles or method in trying to create/perceive order can produce another 
reasonable breakdown of interconnected units. Consequently, it would be just 
  
 27 Cf., by the author: Chose juridique et réification en droit: contribution à la théorie 
marxiste sur la base de l’Ontologie de Lukács. In: Archives de Philosophie du Droit 25 
(1980) 385–411. 
 28 See, by the author: Law and its Doctrinal Study (On Legal Dogmatics). Acta Juridica 
Hungarica 49 (2008) 3, 253–274 & <http://akademiai.com.hu/content/g352w44h 
21258427/fulltext.pdf>. 
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as misguided a self-deception to call this an order or a system29 as it would be 
to recognise some sort of correlation in the very formal deductive thinking 
applied some time ago by Leibniz when attempting to form the corpus of the 
perfect language, the total conceptual system, and the finalised knowledge 
(the ghost of which also resurfaced in connection with the attempted configu-
ration/treatment of law by scientific methodology as a system in David Hilbert’s 
axiomatism-ideal30 as being the test of genuine scientific value), which mandated 
that all individual components be attributed the prestige of an axiom,31 due to 
what in reality was a complete lack of theorems, while with all of this would 
merely create the trap of self-destruction because our procedure would in fact 
cause the notion of axiomatics per se become totally senseless. 
 If we dared even to arrive at any conclusion based on this negation and 
finding of incompleteness, then our first one would obviously be that the 
developmental process as it stands today can only be understood as being 
partial, because in our view even its already established would-be foundations 
and its superstructure to be occupied are lacking: we perceive the presence of 
only coordinated intentions and actions, rather than that of an actually unified 
community.32 We consider as the next relevant observation the notion that there 
is a remarkable absence of a fully developed common legal culture, which 
results in numerous further retardations, thereby multiplying the amplification 
of its own effect. And finally–as our third, although somewhat quietly whispered 
observation–we would like voice our increasingly strongly held belief that in 
European law–a giant conglomerate of uncertain generality (due to all of its 
components being fragmented by special as well as conflicting interests)–the 
specific details of common desires and commitments can be overwritten by 
partial aims that appear to show an increasing level of independent existence. 
And in this we can expect a result no better than something improvised: a step-
by-step progress, predictable planning by default hampered by compromises, 
  
 29 Cf., by the author: Law and its Approach as a System. Acta Juridica Academiae 
Scientiarum Hungaricae 21 (1979) 295–319. 
 30 “I believe that all that can at all be an object of scholarly thought is, by achieving its 
maturity for theory-building, suitable for axiomatic elaboration and thereby also for 
mathematisation.” Hilbert, D.: Axiomatisches Denken. Mathematische Denken, LXXVIII 
(1918) 415 [reprint in William Bragg Ewald (ed.): From Kant to Hilbert. A Source Book 
in the Foundations of Mathematics. Oxford, 1996]. 
 31 Cf., by the author: The Quest for Formalism in Law: Ideals of Systemicity and 
Axiomatisability between Utopianism and Heuristic Assertion. Acta Juridica Hungarica 
50 (2009) 1–30 & <http://www.akademiai.com/content/k7264206g254078j/>. 
 32 Just as one signal, as to sociological foundations, see De Schutter, O.: Europe in 
Search of its Civil Society. European Law Journal, 8 (2002) 198–207. 
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because what could otherwise be conceptually coherent progress can easily be 
(and predominantly is) overwhelmed by ad hoc answers produced with daily 
regularity. In other words, we have what is an institutionally well-formed giant 
structure, which has been filled with meaning and is furthermore operated by a 
well-established bureaucracy, where nonetheless we notice that the hands have 
been taken of the steering wheel. Consequently, individual agents are doing 
whatever they feel most appropriate with their powers. And unless this actually 
leads to some serious unexpected malfunction (materialising in a scandal as an 
eventual political outcome, and in a breakdown or loss of confidence in terms 
of the institutional operation), then we can be certain that daily management 
shall cover and smooth this over by keeping in or pushing into the limelight 
whatever current affair topic arising from the latest conflict happens to be the 
most appealing to the public’s interest. 
 So everything here is a derivative; no single part is actually original yet–
since it is not self-generating, rather all of it is generated. Or, as it is quintes-
sentially expressed: “The law of the EU is not the »European legal culture« 
but the product of the European legal cultures.”33 So however hard we try we 
are at this time unable to locate a „common legal grammar”34 that would be 
comprised of common concepts, thinking, and of uniform attitudes toward 
law. The sense of absence in this regard is felt across the entire community of 
European legal scholars. So it is no wonder then, that those turning disillusion-
ment into positive energy (most often) tend to transpose their desire and sense 
of longing for wholeness into work done toward the preparation of a common 
European codification. This is the form in which the much-desired common 
law’s complexity materialises, involving the fact that the foundations are unclear 
and the American experiment with private (model) codes and unofficial 
restatements of the law is untested. Mostly the path by codes, that is, the 
imposition of a common body of law as centrally enacted is longed for. Leeways 
are also searched for and the Dutch solution with the idea of (national, or 
individual, that is, case to case) optionality is widely proposed. Even the “Common 
Frame of Reference” is seen as a Trojan horse, substituting to codification while 
advancing its continental conceptuality and systemicity, albeit in a way deficient 
of working democracy. All this seems to be hold on; the fact notwithstanding 
that mere principles without the commonality of the underlying cultures in the 
  
 33 Visegrády, A.: Legal Cultures in the European Union. Acta Juridica Hungarica 42 
(2001) 203–217 on 216. 
 34 Zimmermann, R.: Roman Law and the Harmonisation of Private Law in Europe. In: 
Hartkamp, A.–Hesselink, M.–Hondius, E.–Joustra, C.–du Perron, E.–Veldman, M. (eds.): 
Towards a European Civil Code ed. 3rd rev. ed. Nijmegen–The Hague, 2004. 21–42 at 41–42. 
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background cannot guarantee legal security. And although contracts are the most 
technical field of all relationships within the bonds of the private/civil/business 
law, what is hitherto elevated to a community level is mostly the chaos of 
casualism. All that notwithstanding, however, gradual convergence in a kind of 
frameworking regulation can be surely foreseen. 
 The situation is similar in case of the common judiciary as well. The roles 
and mixed styles of, as well as the various interpretations by, the European 
Court of Justice are overviewed so that conclusion as to the nature of pluralism 
and alleged juristocracy characteristic of legal operations of the European Union 
can be drawn. Roles in substitution to both the European Union constitution and 
internal law harmonisation, extended to penal law, representing the entire 
European Union law and order and working in the law’s silence as well, undecided 
whether in a casual or precedential manner but striving for sensitive institutional 
balance all through, while testing a new large-organisation operational structure, 
are all at stake here.35 Style is French-type decision making complemented to 
by English-type general-advocating intervention. Interpretation is complex in 
methods, plurilingually based, fertilising general principles with dubious 
certainty and foreseeability of the law in end result, as fed back by the variety 
of national reactions and autonomously actualising implementations eventually. 
 Naturally, the question may be raised, how could a fresh culture in a 
developmental state have its own tradition.36 Well, as much as this kind of an 
observation is proposing a sensitive excuse, it is just as much based on a 
misunderstanding, since culture is not a matter of time period. So in culture we 
ought not merely look for the length of time continuum as the sign of having 
been canonised by a sense of tradition, it is not the mere fact of a period of 
time having elapsed, rather what we find more crucial is that the concept that 
we characterised as culture be permeated–as a native feature–by the intent to 
pass tradition on.37 However improvisational the present state of the European 
  
 35 Cf., by the author: Szerepfelfogások és stílusok az európai bíráskodásban  [European 
judiciary: Roles and styles]. Állam- és Jogtudomány, 49 (2008) 281–315 {reprint in his 
Jogrendszerek, jogi gondolkodásmódok az európai egységesülés perspektívájában (Magyar 
körkép – európai uniós összefüggésben) [Legal systems, legal mentalities in the perspective 
of European unification: A Hungarian overview – in an European Union context]. Budapest, 
2009. [Az uniós tagság következményei a magyar jogrendszerre és a közigazgatásra] & 
[Jogfilozófiák] & in <www.eulegal-administr.hu>, ch. VI}. 
 36 E.g., Van Hoecke, M.: European Legal Cultures in a Context of Globalisation. In: 
Gizbert-Studnicki, T.–Stelmach, J. (eds.): Law and Legal Cultures in the 21st Century 
Diversity and Unity, Warszawa, 2007. 81–109 at 83. 
 37 Cf., by the author: Legal Traditions? In Search for Families and Cultures of Law. In: 
Moreso, J. J. (ed.).: Legal Theory / Teoría del derecho. Legal Positivism and Conceptual 
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law is, by applying this method, theoretically we may be able to recognise 
those places of more intense concentration that do in fact point in this kind of 
a direction, and which therefore are undoubtedly identifiable as being present. 
Of course, the awareness of tradition building is not enough. For, as its is widely 
expressed, “But the European Union, like any state, needs symbols, memories 
and myths that can be the foci or catalysts of emotional attachment.”38 How-
ever, from another perspective–that of the nations adopting the common rules–
it is worth pondering the fact that the instruments of European law tend to just 
be tossed mechanically onto the pre-existing traditional body of law without 
being organically integrated, or at least an attempt being made at their successful 
integration. For the “European rules are literally copied and inserted into 
domestic legislation, without even any attempt to integrate them into a new 
coherent whole.”39 And this holds the fact notwithstanding that the genuine 
effects shaping domestic laws can be characterised as depending upon factors 
on the merge of the extra-legal as all “it is less a matter of positive law than of 
legal culture.” Consequently, the supposed interaction taking place in the cultural 
context, which is in fact defined as being based on mutual relations, will be 
void of plurality, and will just lead to unilateralist isolation. Furthermore, this 
is taking place within the framework of a process that we have to identify as 
something being governed by the supranational within the national as a 
“currently undergoing legal acculturation”.40 Yet, this gives us the same sense 
of hope we have just referred to above, because it is easy to imagine that the 
series of national acculturations occurring due to the “shock of globalization” 
shall eventually feed back into the slow formation of the whole structure. In other 
words, these immensely elaborate complexes include certain hidden potentials 
of wiggle room and influence exerting mechanisms, which are hardly discoverable 
in advance, yet at the same time are capable of acting counter to the forecasted 
directions and already settled issues to a decisive degree. 
 
                                                     
Analysis / Postivismo jurídico y análisis conceptual. Stuttgart, 2007, 181–193 & [as a 
national report presented at the World Congress of the Académie internationale de Droit 
comparé] in <http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/PDF%20files/IA/IA%20-%20Hungary.pdf> 
& Acta Juridica Hungarica 46 (2005) 177–197 & <http://www.akademiai.com/content/ 
f4q29175h0174r11/fulltext.pdf>}. 
 38 Cotterrell, R.: Images of Europe in Sociolegal Traditions [2005] in his Living Law. 
Studies in Legal and Social Theory. Aldershot–Burlington, Va. 2008, 145–164 on 159. 
 39 Van Hoecke: European Legal Cultures... op. cit. 87. 
 40 Garapon, A.: French Legal Culture and the Shock of ‘Globalization’. Social & Legal 
Studies, 4 (1995) 493–506 at 493. 
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 In sum, culture is defined as a community pattern, a collective programming 
of minds. Legal culture, differentiated from mere uses and skills and attitudes, 
is also defined as a pattern of thinking (in construction and reconstruction 
continued) with a pre-selective force which, as part of the law’s genuine ontology, 
gets shaped by each and every of us within the given culture, even if majored 
mostly by legal professionals. Many objectifications notwithstanding, the 
European Union’s legal culture is deficient, reduced to surface manifestations, 
stimulated by mostly borrowed components. With a variety of available typifi-
cations within the Union, the issue can also be raised which of the national laws’ 
components are getting unified and what is to remain from participating national 
legal cultures if their organic unities are atomised as freely selectable elements. 
 
4.2. Implementing a Grand-System Functioning 
 
So what we may notice then is that all of our legal knowledge acquired so far 
has been rendered senseless, since it has been overwritten by the way European 
law has been functioning. So we now have a new order, which is developing 
as an open system. Certainly, there are given cornerstones, such as values, 
principles, and quite a lot of rules. Nevertheless, all of these are transformed 
into appreciable order, and more significantly, a system with foreseeable future 
developmental stages programmed in advance only by their actual contemporary 
interpretation. Still, none of the components constituting this functioning unit 
are capable of serving us as a point (or points) of departure–as axioms–when 
attempting to describe the general nature of the range of its systemic reach, its 
structure, future processes launched in its name, and normatively referenced 
correlations thereof. In essence, this is such41 that each and every element of it 
is natively contextualised and pre-positioned, that is, it in and of itself does not 
possess a definitive force, so it is only in some sort of flexible and transient 
(i.e., specifically actualised) conjunction with the others that it is capable of 
exhibiting definitive force. But its contextualisation and positioning are provided 
by its actual environment at any given time, that is, its openness toward the 
exterior, its strategic and tactical choices in taking on the challenges posed by 
the real world as its surroundings. In other words, internally it disciplines 
  
 41 For the first, intuitive attempt at the deconstructive reconstruction of how the law is 
structured, see, by the author: Structures in Legal Systems: Artificiality, Relativity, and 
Interdependency of Structuring Elements in a Practical (Hermeneutical) Context. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 43 (2002) 219–232 <http://www.akademiai.com/content/r27863g 
6u01q777u/fulltext.pdf> & in Moréteau, O.–Vanderlinden, J. (eds.): La structure des 
systèmes juridiques. Brussels, 2003. 291–300. 
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according to what is concurrent, because it deals with the questions to be answered 
within its relatively closed system, but mostly not in any way that would result 
in achieving any degree of authoritative certainty, that is, exclusivity or 
singularity without alternatives. It activates with the tools of forum, scope of 
power, and decision, with which it always closes off (reseals) its system within 
the realm of the here and now at any given time; however this then does not in 
and of itself become the root of the same or other forums, scopes of power, or 
decisions belonging to the consecutive phase, so the only real derivative is that 
the carriers of today’s processes shall–theoretically and according to the notion 
of what is expectable–be founded on the previous system’s state of systemic 
self-closure. This is because these cornerstones themselves are divergent: they 
are facing various different directions while carrying different potentials as 
well, that is, in and of themselves they are of significance, but they do not 
form a closed system, therefore its particular interpretation on any given day 
is always (in)formed by their continuous balancing based on unending updating. 
 Therefore we believe that envisioning any sort of counter-posed or perhaps 
antagonistic bipolar relation would be fundamentally off-target, it would precisely 
deny the basic idea of the European Union itself. The reason for this is that we 
do not see this as a case of the European entity facing off with all the national 
ones, rather the former is a central (directly and exclusively communal) forum 
existing along with those of the member states’, and making decisions regarding 
their affairs (at least in an indirect way), while the latter are all European 
entities themselves. As it is being stated nowadays, the judges of national 
courts themselves are (or, in fact should be) obliged to conduct even the more 
intimate/internal affairs as European judges, in essence keeping in mind the 
principles governing a Europe that is becoming increasingly more integrated.42 
 
4.3. With Legal Pluralism? 
 
Legal pluralism is the case especially of the European Union,43 “when it 
contains inconsistent rules of recognition that cannot be legally resolved from 
within the system.”44 
 In order to contain and set a final limit to the process of pluralisation that 
had been becoming increasingly arbitrary, the European Court of Justice has 
  
 42 Slaughter, A.-M.–Stone Sweet, A.–Weiler, J. (eds.): The European Court and National 
Courts. Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its Social Context, Oxford, 1998. 
 43 See primarily La Torre, passim. 
 44 Barber, N. W.: Legal Pluralism and the European Union. European Law Journal, 12 
(2006) 306–329 on 306. 
  LEGAL THEORISING 437 
  
declared and has had it declared three times that it has primacy and supremacy. 
For, according to its founding charter, it “is entitled to definitively answer all 
questions of European law”45 and, as concluded by the doctrine based on its own 
jurisprudence, “is entitled to determine what constitutes an issue of European 
law”46 and “has supremacy over all conflicting rules of national law”47–without all 
this being by far not yet sufficient to in and of itself capable of guaranteeing 
that no overlapping and inconsistency occur.48 
 This is exactly the root of the hope-filled desire that if we could somehow 
interpret the entire European legal system’s structure–and within it the ongoing 
dynamics created by omnipresent, unavoidable conflicts, and the ad-hoc system 
of providing the resolutions thereof–within the framework of the perspective 
of limited pluralism, then the end result could be a more controllable overall 
scenario. As the proposition forwarded suggests, “the pluralist model provides 
a comprehensive framework within which these inconsistent claims can coexist. 
Provided that the practical conflict within this model remains potential, and 
actual disputes are avoided, this can provide a stable, even a long-lasting, form 
of settlement.” By the force of this, “It encourages the Court of Justice to 
interpret European law in a manner that will be palatable to national courts, 
and, at the same time, discourages national courts from blindly insisting on the 
primacy of national rules. In short, the competing supremacy claims may serve 
to create an atmosphere of cooperation between the courts, where each side 
has an incentive to strive to respect the position and tradition of the other.”49 
 Well, we have every right to view–at first sight–these kinds of (and similar) 
attempts to find a solution as arising from a sense of paralysis, and characterise it 
as a valiant yet laughably Utopist; after all, it is a rather rare occurrence in 
history that a large structure would purposefully hinder its own process of 
attempting to reach what would otherwise be a state of perfection in relation to 
its desired rule of rationality, by incorporating structural components that 
create confusion and impede its own progress. But as soon as we take it for 
granted that the European Union–as it exists today–could only have been 
formed from its predecessor formations and the latter’s deformities in such a 
way that it created its unity from the inter-national and the national (derived 
from the entities that are the member states) –where the former enjoys primacy, 
but the latter maintains the right of updating vis-à-vis itself–with only a limited 
  
 45 Quoted ibid. 323, with reference EC Art. 234 (ex Art 177). 
 46 C-314/85 Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost (1987) European Court Reports 4199. 
 47 C-6/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964) European Court Reports 585. 
 48 Barber: op. cit. 323. 
 49 Ibid., 328 and 328–329. 
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number of guarantees used as the glue, then we are forced to apply a dose of 
reality and be grounded in our thinking. And this then is the confirmation of 
the fact that this is a machine that is far from being able to guarantee smooth 
operation; yet it is exactly due to the structure affording its inherent forces 
(which are at the same time of a centripetal and centrifugal nature) a large 
degree of free flow and play, that an uninterrupted dynamism is present, 
which advances or may advance the cause of the common Europe through 
the contemporaneous processes behind unity and diversity–that is, those of 
partial autonomies grouped under the umbrella of a single overriding dominion–
and through the temporal chain of solutions dissolving conflicts arising from 
them. 
 But if this is so, then it follows from this that we pose the question: can we 
truly call pluralism what we are talking about here. If it is religious command-
ments or ethical rules, territorial customs, mercantile ususes, sets of professional 
expectations or self-regulations of associations that fall within the system of 
referential gravitational pull of law, then the right of pluralism to exist is truly 
legitimate, because it is independently existing and operational dynamic entities 
that find themselves on a common platform on an ad-hoc basis, and here it is 
indeed the law (the formal positing by the status of statehood) that happens 
to do the referencing; but that which is being referenced, nevertheless, is 
contributing / may contribute its own essence and criteriality–in an unchanged 
state. However, European legal order–as we saw earlier–has a certain multi-
polar nature, whereby a few of the European Union’s institutions of “»mixed« 
authority”–in which “the power-sharing composition […] does not […], in 
practice, work in a clear way”50–do in fact carry on with their legislative, 
executive, and judiciary tasks, but they will only be able to apply the end results 
thereof in a precarious structural position (addressing mostly the state institu-
tions and citizens of the member states), where these national state agencies 
on the one hand adopt these results in one way or another (or refuse to do so by 
the means of some technical manoeuvre), but on the other hand, subsequently 
the adoption of these community norms become target for challenge (based on 
the method of adoption or the shortcomings of the adopted norms) either by 
other state agencies or individual citizens (or some organised group formation 
thereof) in front of either the national courts of the same member state, or some 
community level forum. So, on the one hand then, the community-level entity 
has no true independent life, since its only task and raison d’être is the represen-
  
 50 Torma, A.: Közigazgatás – Európai Unió – európai közigazgatás [Public administration, 
European Union, European public administration]. In: Szabadfalvi J. (ed.): Facultas 
nascitur. 10 éves a jogászképzés Miskolcon. Miskolc, 2001, 493–526 at 522. 
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tation and management of the community interlinking the member states. On 
the other hand, all that is derived from all this member state officialdom is not 
simply a reflex or projection of the centrally posited, but inevitably creative 
weighing and adaptation as well, which among themselves (and especially 
within the sphere of these acts layered on top of each other), and in conjunction 
with interpretations by other member states, and naturally, also in light of the 
general community perspective, provide a fertile ground for a series of possible 
conflicts to occur. 
 Yet still, the legal order of the European Union has no other life than the 
dynamism inherent in this. And this then, including its tensions and resolutions, 
continuously results in both solutions and repeated accumulation of conflicts 
within the institutional manifestation of what is, after all, a communal existence. 
 It is this complexity, and the slow and uncertain organic integration similar 
to the theoretical solution mentioned above (or more precisely: from the inherent 
order-out-of-chaos philosophy that is ultimately the hidden core here), that may 
be the reason why–until this day–it remains practically unmentioned that one 
of the European Court of Justice’s prime function would be to foster the process 
of the European legal order becoming internally more coherent and functioning 
harmoniously, which task and the latter’s completion, however, “remains under-
theorized, [...] remained relatively unaffected by the rich legal-philosophical 
literature on adjudication”.51 
 
 
5. Theoretical Model of the Operation of European Law 
 
5.1. Multipolarity with Centripetality and Centrifugality 
 
The metaphor of the solar system as a sub-systemic part of the galaxy describes 
such a relational sphere of the masses inside–which are moving along their 
path amidst the relevant physical forces–that is derived from their mutually 
relative positioning during their continuous movement, and the organising 
principles and facts connected to energy, mass, and position (as basic attributes) 
of which are depicted by our human culture of the modern era through the 
laws of physics.52 The paths of these masses are at once centripetal and 
  
 51 de Búrca: G.: Introduction. In: de Búrca, G.–Weiler, J. H. H. (eds.): The European 
Court of Justice. Oxford, 2001. 1–8 at 3. 
 52 For the development of the history of relevant ideas, cf. Needham, J.: Human Law 
and the Laws of the Nature [Hobhouse Lecture at the Bedford College in London, 1951] in 
his The Grand Titration. London, 1969, 299–332 as well as–for a comprehensive overview– 
440 CSABA VARGA 
  
centrifugal–as they are at all times balanced–and are defined by interrelations 
derived from the given quantitative characteristics of the given positions. In 
the realm of sociality, with the metaphor applied to ius commune, we can see a 
different equation, where we have polyphony resulting from the centrifugal 
forces gradually forming national separations (started by towns, princes, etc.) 
within the monophony of a Christian Europe, with these forces eventually 
overwhelming the counterbalancing exerted by the centripetal nature of the 
culture justified by and justifying through the common tradition. 
 The legal reality of the European Union is derived from its bipolar structure, 
because when its centrally posited rules are locally integrated into practice 
(which is defined by the sovereignty of the nation state), this is done under 
circumstances whereby (and while) even law posited autonomously by the 
sovereign nation state is subjugated to that posited by the European Union, 
since the former may not go against the latter due to the latter having direct 
force and validity (thusly primacy); and so we get what is a somewhat altered 
metaphor of the solar and planetary system. In this tailor-made metaphor we 
have a centrifugal aspect that is merely a reaction to the (f)act of having joined 
the process of European integration, that is, we see a process of divergence 
based on the fact that even though having to give up certain blocks of sovereignty 
is a well-known prerequisite of joining the European Union, nevertheless, the 
national interest now within the European framework is making attempts at a 
sort of optimal harm-reduction aimed at rendering the effects of partially lost 
sovereignty minimal. And in this case the centripetal force is represented not 
by the (canon law of) “Roman” tradition of the club of Christian nobility or any 
other common ideology, rather it is exerted by the uninterrupted flow of texts 
composed in the row of working languages and background cultures. 
 It is exactly due to this divisionalisation of sovereignty–as this sort of 
structuring is derived from a constitutional level, since its source is the treaty 
(treaties) establishing the Union–why the theoretical possibility of discrepancy 
is natively present in even the conceptualisation of this solution. It is rather rare 
that we see overt attempts at finding out just exactly how far the boundaries of 
discrepancy lay, how much farther the walls can be pushed outwards, and 
neither is it common that we see a player pronouncedly rejecting these–this 
being against the rules. But covertly the governments and judiciaries of member 
states do this all the time, in a way finding an outlet for their need to experience 
their national independence. This is primarily so, because their constitutions
                                                     
Daston, L.–Stolleis, M. (eds.): Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe. 
Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy. Farnham–Burlington, VT, 2008. 
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define these truly national institutions as genuine national agencies–a definition 
connected to the relation of the executive and the judiciary being of a subordinate 
nature to the legislative. Their legal status as well as the body of law to be 
applied by them is provided from the single source of the legislation working 
within the framework of statehood. Consequently, they have a centuries-old 
intimate relationship with their own national law, since this is their natural 
habitat. And since their professional activity is subordinated to the legislative 
body of their own homeland, even such a scenario is possible where, in a 
borderline situation, is actually rooting for his or her own case, so to speak, in 
opposition to his or her own law. 
 Yet they receive the body of European Union law as (well, let us say) a mere 
extra task, a sort of chore, which merely multiplies what is an already ample 
body of domestic sources of law. So they usually treat these similarly to how 
an English judge would treat statutory instruments when simply following 
their own tradition: with distrust, as a sort of hampering, almost a illegitimate 
meddling that should best be avoided. And if this external intrusion is unavoid-
able, then the judge shall respect it only to the extent that he or she absolutely 
has to. 
 So to summarise: although law-making and law-application in their polarised 
dichotomy manifest as an external obligation for the judge, still he or she treats 
and respects the domestic law as his or her own, because it is in fact his or hers. 
This is in contrast to the European law, which the judge only experiences as 
something arriving on his or her bench in a whimsical fashion from distant 
outside powers beyond his or her reach, and coming in forceful and unpredictable 
waves, with blatant disregard for their own level of integrability. While a judge 
is continuously contributing to the building of the body of law formulated by 
his or her legislator, because the judge feels that he or she is in fact part of the 
process of dogmatic refinement, rejuvenation based on actualisation, with the 
European law the judge is not very much exuberant about the possibility of 
contributing to progress–among other reasons, because his or her chance to 
contribute is at best limited, perhaps even practically nonexistent. Therefore his 
or her perspective remains that of the domestic law–regardless of what happens 
to be the premier background of his or her particular procedure. 
 In any case, the model of the legal order of the European Union has, so to 
speak, spread the process of “law-provision” over different tiers–with almost 
as much conscious determination as Hans Kelsen once had, when in 1922 he 
revised his original stand from before WWI on law-application and imputa-
tion/ascription as a mere consequence calculation and validation, by declaring 
that for the Rechtserzeugungsprozess to actually occur, there are at least two 
stages needed, since the actualised (i.e., case specific) application of the 
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future-bound–and therefore general-abstract–posited can only take place in the 
context of the given specific.53 
 
5.2. Order, Out of Chaos 
 
Until the 20th century practitioners of our social sciences (including our legal 
science) could hardly imagine that law or any somewhat objectified normativity 
could in fact be effective without a positivism that treated its subject with clear 
definition existing behind it–so without support being provided by such an 
assumption of an operational order being present, which would be able to 
provide the state judiciary, the professional discipline, the teaching church (etc.) 
with grounds allowing it to clearly translate into the language of practice–and 
enforce with its sanctioning mechanisms that which is posited by the given 
normative order. It presented its operation as being mechanised in its ideology: 
sort of as a truly ausdifferenziert homogeneity (following Niklas Luhmann’s 
terminology of Ausdifferenzierung), thus lifting the procedures performed in 
the name of the above-mentioned entities above general everyday heterogeneity. 
So what did it do then? It lifted a conceptual order above the everyday, it has 
rendered itself reified, and in a somewhat alienated form it (relying on secret 
knowledge incomprehensible and enigmatic for the everyday person) promoted 
into the status of brutally unquestionable consistency and necessity that which 
appeared, with good reason, to the excluded layperson to be not only without 
convincing power, but also even an indecipherable and randomly cruel twist of 
fate.54 In short: it chased chaos away in order to see order in its place. Because 
chaos and order are in this approach antinomies, and when faced with them, 
we either pick the one or the other. 
 It was with the arrival of 20th century sociology that we see the reformula-
tion of the descriptive vision of society. The previous understanding of society 
as the conglomerate of manmade reified structures in self-propelled motion 
was replaced by a model that was not based on a one-way mechanicalness (as 
is the case with the definition above), rather, it was focusing on the spontaneous 
motion of concurring simultaneities, and on the continuously occurring social 
practice within them, on the statistical result of the motivational-battles of 
individuals, on interactions occurring in actuality. And surprisingly–although 
  
 53 Cf., by the author: Kelsen’s Theory of Law-application: Evolution, Ambiguities, Open 
Questions. Acta Juridica Hungarica 36 (1994) 3–27. 
 54 Cf., by the author: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking, Budapest, 1999 
and A. Conklin, W. A.: The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse. The Judicial 
Production and the Disclosure of Suffering. Aldershot, 1998. 
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its descriptions of the micro were recording nothing but chaos (a continuous 
floating and state of in-between within the perpetuity of attractive and repulsive 
forces)–still, thanks to the development that in all of this it was, nevertheless, 
always and determinately searching exclusively for signs of order being created 
(including the details of how, along what avenues, principles, perspectives, 
and with what chance of success), in its descriptions of the macro it could 
arrive at the logical conclusion of the potential for and fact of order out of 
chaos, that is, one originating from, borne out and derived from chaos. 
 And it is important to note here that the theoretical notion of macro-order 
originating and eventually manifesting from micro-chaos is what laid the 
foundation of the general perspective of modern economics; modern sociology 
is also rooted in this perspective; and this is the theorematic fundament 
eventually settled on by the deconstructionist aspect of today’s jurisprudence, 
and this latter–incidentally–is a branch of scholarship with much older theoretical 
foundations and developmental span than the former ones.55 
 Today’s social analysts call our attention to the fact that according to the 
“normativist model” of the early 20th century–from Émile Durkheim to Talcott 
Parsons–“society after society was depicted primarily in terms of the consistency, 
regularity, and continuity of its system of rules and of the power of these rules 
to bring about behavioral conformity”.56 It was only later that the recognition 
has been formulated according to which “The essence of human life did not lie 
in following rules and in being rewarded by one’s virtue but in making the 
best use of rules for one’s own self-interest, depending on the situation”. From 
this time on, social theories are changed in that “rules are seen as ambiguous, 
flexible, contradictory, and inconsistent; [...] they serve as resources for human 
strategies, strategies that vary from person to person and from situation to 
situation... Order is never complete and never can be”.57 
 Well, this has the realisation serving as its foundation deeply rooted in 
social theory, according to which we have absolutely no criteria available to us 
for providing proof of “differentiating at an ontological level” among the 
various branches of social sciences. Jurisprudence too is comfortably floating 
on being propelled by its concept of normativity (the force of normative 
enactments, and so on), while it has absolutely no social scientific affirmation 
  
 55 Cf., by the author: Theory of the Judicial Process. The Establishment of Facts. 
Budapest, 1995. 
 56 Reynolds, N. B.: Rule of Law in Legal and Economic Theory. In: Kotsiris, L. E. (ed.): 
Law at the Turn of the Twentieth Century. Thessaloniki, 1994. 357–376 on 373. 
 57 Edgerton, R. B.: Rules, Exceptions, and Social Order. Berkeley, 1985. 13 and 14. 
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that it could point to for support.58 And this may result in cynical, apparently 
relativising attitudes–with the dry constatation, for instance, that “the making 
of rules and social and symbolic order is a human industry matched only by 
the manipulation, circumvention, remaking, replacing and unmaking of rules 
and symbols in which people seem almost equally engaged”59–, unless we are 
cognisant of the fact that this description originates from the classic author of 
cultural anthropology: relying on a diagnosis of standard human behaviour 
exactly so that she could somehow be enabled to demonstrate the nature of the 
eventual order rising out of the chaotic nature thereof. 
 Well, it is as if early on the deconstructionism of legal science seemed to 
have dethroned the professional tenet of legal positivism, voiding it with 
critique that was exposing it for what it was and irreversibly (destructively) 
overwriting it. In the long run, however, this seems to have produced the result 
of the previous static vision of order–whereby everything is rendered reified 
with mechanical simplicity–being replaced by the potential for order being 
described as a process, through / understood as / traced back to the attribute of 
the ceaseless dynamism of fluctuating motion. In terms of the methodology of 
fermenting this train of thought, it was perhaps Ludwig Wittgenstein, then on 
the one hand, the speech-act theory (as the consequence of the auto-transub-
stantiation of the positivist philosophy of science), and on the other hand, the 
cognitive sciences that played the most decisive role in contributing. As a new 
systemic concept this could then become the point of departure for imagining 
a self-organised entity that would be constructed through autopoiesis–that is, 
through a process whereby the systemic end-result features solid and confident 
self-identity, despite its internal governing principles having been formed 
along the way through a variable and protracted process. It was the English–
American movement of Critical Legal Studies60–which, functioning perhaps as 
an agent provocateur, was questioning the underlying ideology and offering new 
methodology at the same time–that reshaped the landscape most effectively 
and to the most radical extent, yet the final conclusions were drawn (concurrently, 
and in terms of partial result perhaps even ahead of it) by a new legal 
ontology.61 
  
 58 Luhmann, N.: A Sociological Theory of Law. London, 1985, 13, noting on 20 that 
“Until today there is not a single notable beginning to a sociological theory of the 
positivity of law.” 
 59 Falk Moore, S.: Law as Process. London–Boston, 1978. 
 60 Cf. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_legal_studies>. 
 61 Cf., by the author: Towards the Ontological Foundation of Law (Some Theses on the 
Basis of Lukács’ Ontology. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto [Roma] LX 
(1983) 127–142 {& in Filosofía del Derecho y Problemas de Filosofía Social X, coord. 
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 The reason for this was that the latter could raise the level of discourse 
onto a higher level in terms of social scientific significance, as it managed to 
place both the external ideological criticism (which, based on an epistemological 
approach, was attacking from a counter-position and aiming at revealing 
hidden weaknesses) and the criticism of the methodology applied by lawyers 
when establishing their visions of the world inside the process-description of 
the actual operation of law, thusly it could analyse the components discovered 
therein as true ontological entities. Since it characterised the overall social 
complex as it exists at any given time as it is measured by the status of self-
affirmative exertion (at any given time) manifesting in the interaction of partial-
complexes of natively relative autonomy that eventually form some sort of 
final (tendential) unity resting on an identifiable trend. And hidden inside of 
this we have–even as far as the operation of law is concerned–what is an 
obligatory prerequisite for today’s economy-centred mainstream materialism: 
the conflict of interests embedded in the collision of different manifestations 
of legal formalism, and in those scenarios where abstract positive legal rules 
are applied in specific cases conjuring discrepancies in practical implementation. 
Nonetheless, it is exactly the legally constructed formulation of conflict-
resolution and conflict-settlement within the legal professional methodology’s 
process-reconstructions that fill the gap between–on the one hand–the lack of 
a truly unbroken chain of logic, and–on the other hand–the specifically unique 
nature of an adjudication situation (in which the adjudicator fills an irrevocably 
personal role of a constitutive character with an irrevocable and non-trans-
ferable personal responsibility attached to adjudicator’s participation). 
 In all of this we can find the explanation (in terms of the legal organisation 
of the European Union) for what which we have introduced as the bipolar 
structure comprised of–on the one hand–the production and releasing of law 
by the European Union as a supranational entity, and–on the other hand–the 
reception and conversion thereof by the member states, and–thirdly–as the 
simultaneity of randomly colourful motion propelled by centripetal and centrifugal 
                                                     
José Luis Curiel B. (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 1984), 203–
216 [Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Serie G, Estudios doctrinales, 81] & 
<http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/3/1051/20.pdf>} as well as–in a systematic treatment–
his The Place of Law in Lukács’ World Concept. Budapest, 1985 [reprint: 1991], particularly 
Part Two, 69 et seq. For a present-day summary, cf., also by him: ‘Contemporaneity of 
Lukács’ Idea to Modern Social Theoretical Thought (The Ontology of Social Being in Social 
Science Reconstructions–with Regards to Constructs like Law)’ [a closing lecture at the III 
Seminário Internacional Teoria Politica do Socialismo on Lukacs e a emancipação 
humana organised by the Universidad Estadual Paulista, Faculdade de filosofia e ciências 
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446 CSABA VARGA 
  
forces, which nonetheless has the net result of creating order with its overall 
cohesive critical mass. So which of these forces is of a creative nature in this 
precariously balanced (balancing) structure? Well, according to the above, 
these are, on the one hand, the explicit legislative activity of the whole of the 
representative institutions of the European Union, and that of its agencies 
empowered to produce and put law into force (manifesting in the power to 
enter treaties, release directives, and produce court rulings), as well as its tacit 
legislation (which demands recognition under the aegis of acquis communautaire), 
and, on the other hand, the reception given to all of these by the member states 
at their organisational-institutional levels (e.g., how they carry their validity 
into further spheres, how they adapt and implement them). And the final product 
of all of this is no other than something nobody has attempted to describe thus 
far, although this could be a sort of a The State of the Law of the European 
Union similar to what is recurring practice of the State of the Union in the 
United States.62 
 As we know from George Lukács’ gigantic socio-ontological undertaking,63 
man’s conscious identifications of aims always tend to get realised differently 
from the original target, as they end up being either relatively more or less, or 
they may simply get realised as something entirely different. And as we know 
also from him: this is not merely a sign of divergency, a margin for error, a human 
failure, a lack of a valiant effort, or perhaps that of futility, rather a fundamental 
fact of socio-ontology, and as such, it is the starting point of any praxis-philosophy 
understood as a system of social theory capable of providing/venturing to seek 
an actual description of practice. So the order that–in concerto–happens to be 
produced out of all of this, is exactly whatever could possibly evolve at all as 
the result of the free-flowing and fixed forces active in the system. Observing 
it at any given time, its corresponding state is then such a characteristic, in the 
framework, on the ground, and from the origin of which–exactly as just-so-
being [Gerade-so-Sein] in the exclusive ontological actuality–all subsequent 
movements are taking place. 
 It is strange for us to recall today about Engels–who attempted to apply 
Hegel’s methodological notions to the philosophy of science of his times–just 
how much his multifaceted concept of dialectics (which, despite its dogmas 
and certain erroneous components, included at least the potential for some 
sense of openness in terms of prospect), rigidified, and subsequently became 
  
 62 Cf., e.g., <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_the_Union_address>. 
 63 By Lukács, G.: The Ontology of Social Being Hegel’s False and his Genuine Ontology. 
London, 1978, Marx’s Basic Ontological Principles. London, 1978 [reprint: 1982]), and 
Labour, London, 1980, as well as Benseler, F. (ed.): Prolegomena, I–II, Darmstadt, 1984–1986. 
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the scene of brutally irrefutable and inexorable (perhaps best described as 
automatically predestined) social processes in the Soviet version of Marxism, 
as a materialistic theology of a kind of order, which possesses such a sense of 
superiority, perfection, and completeness (derived from having been successfully 
finalised), which is equal in measure exactly to the degree of to which it is free 
of contradiction at any given time. It also brings a smile to our face when we 
recall that it could have actually been the dilettantism of the Chinese Socialist 
dictator, Mao Tse-Tung,64 when it came to his dabbling in philosophy (which 
incidentally also relied on elements of Eastern wisdom), that may have opened 
the eyes of the then already Sovietised Central and Eastern European region to 
the notion that to rebut, that is, contradiction, is no antonym of order. It is not 
anarchy, not rebellion, not counterrevolution; thusly it is neither a matter of 
state security. Because it is in fact not a sign of rejection (through statements), 
rather it is a natural sign of life, as such is the true lifestyle of any organism 
that is in fact actually functioning; or to use Lukács-speak once again: it is the 
phenomenal form of the quality that anything that can operate is performing 
its operation along the aforementioned line, this being a fundamental fact of 
existence, opposite to which there can be nothing but the denial of life (i.e., 
motionlessness or death). 
 So tension, conflict, or the fact that resolutions of issues are reached via 
difficult processes at any given time are not signs of dysfunction, rather these 
are the functionality of any truly operational system. No manifestation of a 
lack of order, rather it is exactly the unavoidable prerequisite for and the way 
of the reconstruction/reaffirmation of order (theoretically always at a higher 
level), which is a naturally occurring and necessary process from time-to-time, 
as order has to be able to provide answers to the challenges facing it and has to 
withstand when practical (compromise) solutions are reached at any given 
time, storms of expectations as well. 
 
5.3. Practical Continuum in a Standing Flux 
 
It is this kind of kinetic-dynamism into which we have the structuring solution 
for the problem that a serious portion of the European Union’s legal manifesta-
tions are of a soft, rather than a hard nature integrated, that is, this law can 
hardly be interpreted within the static framework of formalism containing such 
plain polarities as obligatory / not obligatory, can be applied / cannot be applied, 
or valid / not valid. So all of this presents us a flexible image (i.e., a kind actually 
  
 64 Mao Tse-tung: On Contradiction. Peking, 1952 & On Practice and Contradiction. 
London–New York, 2007. 
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not binding through its formal character) of law (allowing for ever-changing 
conclusions being drawn from case to case, based on the various inter-
pretations of cases and standards dependent on context or the criterion of what 
is purposeful), which is an exact denial of both the classic legal positivism 
characteristic of our Continental yesteryears as well as that of our Socialist 
European yesterday,65 since it overwrites the possibility of imagining a law 
of “a purely domestic character”.66 Because what it offers instead is merely 
continuum.67 It is the most that we could discover today through an ontological 
reconstruction as a final truth behind the formalism and discipline-obligation 
of the kinetic processes of law.68 Our supplementary factor here is, however, 
that those classic form-structures that have been relied on by the individual 
nations have by now mostly been weakened by having been integrated into the 
legal order of the European Union; and the professional deontology implied as 
its own recommends a kind of concentration (which is deconstructive in the formal 
sense, as it is destroying even the remaining legal homogeneity) on expressly 
substantial (i.e., one merely referred by the legal normative expression, but not 
contained therein, thus heterogeneous) contents. 
 In addition to the continuous presence of and reliance on the teleological, 
the other element that has also been serving as the foundation of this was the 
juridical formulation of the doctrine of “direct application”69 and “indirect 
effect”70 as early as a quarter century ago. However, characteristically of the 
professionally formulated obscure speech of the European Union, this burst 
  
 65 It is to be noted that the kind of regulation known as Aufgabe-Normen [task-norms] 
in the East-German regime that used law as an effective means of organisation was all 
through criticised by the official Soviet and satellite legal policy and scholarship alike, 
because they set (of course) objectives without defining pre-/pro-scription and sanction. 
 66 Berger, K. P.: The Harmonisation of European Contract Law: The Influence of 
Comparative Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 50 (2001) 877–900 at 887. 
 67 Kühn, Z.: The Application of European Law in the New Member States: Several 
(Early) Predictions. German Law Journal, 6 (2005) 563–582 & <http://www.germanlaw 
journal.com/pdf/Vol06No03/PDF_Vol_06_No_03_563-582_Articles_Kuhn.pdf>, 579. 
 68 Cf., by the author: On the Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning. Logique 
et Analyse [Leuwen] (1973) 21–78 [Travaux de Centre National de Recherches de Logique], 
as well as Theory of the Judicial Process (1995) and Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal 
Thinking (1999). 
 69 “The validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be 
effected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by 
the constitution of that state or the principles of a national constitutional structure.” C-
11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) European Court Reports 1125, 3. 
 70 C-14/83 Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (1984) European Court Reports I-
1891. 
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into the legal order thereof in such a way, that it, on the one hand, has left it 
unclear to this day exactly what, when, and under what circumstances (i.e., in 
the presence of what fulfilled conditions) can the centrally posited overwrite that 
by the national legislation; and, on the other hand, it continued to maintain the 
national legal orders on the polar opposite side, while leaving the task to the 
national side to adapt or exchange the nationally posited for anything originating 
from the community; a process that has thusly continued to be based on domestic 
application, that is, on the discretion of local contemplation and interpretation. 
Since no other conclusion could indeed be drawn than the one according to 
which “the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the 
result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 5 of the Treaty 
to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the 
fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of Member States 
including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the Courts. It follows that, in 
applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before 
or after the directive, the national Court called upon to interpret it is required 
to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter.”71 
 It is easy for us to see, that it was the entire legal perspective of the 
European Union which was turned into a pragmatic-instrumentality instead of 
the primacy of any legal dogmatism in this way, being true to its ever more 
openly acknowledged mobilising function, rather than being true to its regulatory 
function in the classic narrow sense.72 
 It is well known that in the large structure itself, which is being built 
during the process of operation, beyond the directives influencing only certain 
limited areas, it is undoubtedly the court rulings (which also take on the task 
of securing the entire legal order and constitutionality) that set the milestones; 
with a huge number of consequential results that often set even the vision of 
the role of the community courts on new paths, and these results can occasionally 
be more dramatic than even the founding treaties concluded with the utmost 
formality. Consequentially in this process, as a result of the liberating effect 
of these factors, the authors of the European law continue down the slippery 
slope and tend to keep upping the ante by proposing ever-bolder ideas, thereby 
further eroding this formlessness. They draw legal conclusion from trends and 
  
 71 C-106/89 Marleasing SA v. La Commercial International de Alimentation SA (1990) 
ECR I-4135, 8 (with reference to the case of Von Colson quoted above). 
 72 For their antagonism in conflict periods or in succession, cf., as a case-study by the 
author: Lenin and Revolutionary Law-making. International Review of Contemporary 
Law. 29 (1982) 47–59. 
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facts of institutional developments, while the only framework provided for any 
of this kind of activity (regarding the role of the judiciary, the alleged dissolution 
of any formal-doctrinal discipline, the ultimate ideal of the pragmatic ambition 
capable of penetrating just about anything) is the overgeneralisation of other 
authors. Moreover, it is as if nobody was bothered by the fact that (whether it 
be a community act, or the generalisations of a free-floating intellect that we 
are talking about) even the bare minimum of what was regarded as a sine qua 
non even in the Socialist doctrine is absent: laying the foundation of whatever 
is the target of their eventual intervention with first doing preparatory work, 
case-studies and debates on cost/benefit analysis, and with the identification 
and affixing of the actual cornerstones. 73 Yet they keep skipping these steps, 
since we can only find a limited number of pointers about the underlying basic 
issue whether a precedent-type law is in fact alive or is in the process of 
development inside the womb of the European Union (and if so, then which 
type of it, which sui generis version of it); these pointers being certain judicial 
decisions of unclear status themselves, which are not overtly identified as 
possessing the quality of precedent, and where this quality is only identified a 
personal interpretation of the author, based on self-referential clues, or on 
consequences drawn from other clues. But if all that intuitive reconstruction 
can decipher out of any such signal is that–along certain fundamental material 
values and procedural principles, and with the insertion of certain forums–it is 
the efficiency of reaching target that is of premier importance, then we have 
indeed returned to reliving74 the excitement-filled historical time of the 
“revolutionary honeymoon period”.75 Since this means that the state of things 
is such that the main area of action is the mobilisation for self-propelled social 
activity and the encouragement of autocatalytic processes (akin to grass-roots 
initiatives), in an atmosphere where each player is stopping the building of new 
boundaries at their own doorstep; a building process that, incidentally, is 
continuously breaking down the previously demarcated ones. 
 Consequently, these kinds of complex movements, including divergent 
motions, discernible in the legal reality of the European Union simply represent 
  
 73 E.g., the Act XI (1987) of the Hungarian People’s Republic on Law-making. 
 74 Within the scope of his own research, cf., by the author: ‘Lenin and Revolutionary 
Law-making’ and–regarding its variation during the Chinese “cultural revolution”–
Codification..., especially 239–242, as well as–in view of our subject here–‘Jogi kultúránk 
– európai és globális távlatban’ [Our legal culture in a European and global perspective]. 
In: Paksy, M. (ed.): Európai jog és jogfilozófia. Tanulmányok az európai integráció ötvene-
dik évfordulójának ünnepére. Budapest, 2008, 13–42. 
 75 For its first description, see Pitirim A[leksandrovich] Sorokin: The Sociology of 
Revolution. Philadelphia–London, 1925. 
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a certain state, that of being alive, and, moreover, as a necessary actualised 
form and consequence of its consciously designed multipolarity. Naturally, from 
an analytical perspective, ultimately it is not the presence of these factors that 
is of interest, rather it is the longitudinal tracking and observation of whether 
or not the totality of these motions exhibits the character of a singular trend 
when evaluated at the end of their respective time period, and if such uniform 
(tendential) trend is in fact identifiable, then what is the nature thereof. In 
other words, how does the end result likely to manifest measure up against the 
one that had been ideally expected at the outset; is there a need for intervention 
to correct the course, that is, is it called for that the future course of these be 
reset with the tools at hand, and if so then in what direction. 
 It also follows from the above that it can only be considered wishful and 
rather simplified ideological thinking (bordering on the Utopian), based on 
which the statement could be made that, based on what is undoubtedly a level 
of integration getting higher by the day, both the European Union and its law 
shall eventually reach a uniform or unified state, so to speak. Because this would 
not result in the coming of some End of History76–so that an eschatological 
synthesis could then bless our everyday reality–since never in history have we 
actually witnessed, as a socio-ontological reality, humankind reaching a final 
state of rest longed for in the form of a transcendental final arrival. So whatever 
is taking place now is actually not a process eventually terminating in a final 
uniformity, not convergence, not a final resolution, and neither is it an ultimate 
coming together of all the contributors in a projected future Golden Age at the 
end of a single path. Instead, we should likely say that in the current structure of 
the European Union the discrete parts (existing at any given time) preserve 
their state of standing apart while and via being diverging components of partial 
units constantly restated/reaffirmed at ever higher levels. Accordingly, the 
discrepancies necessarily regenerated at any given time are not so much 
contradictions based on the denial of something, rather they are variations 
forming with a relative independence on top of a principal thesis that is merely 
implicitly expressed (because these variations–just as in the repetitious fugal 
structure–express the main theme in their fragmentary quality). 
 
5.4. Activated by Nations 
 
However, at the same time, several further consequences result from the 
recognition of the above. Since in this sort of complex kinetic scenario only 
that gets actually realised in practice, which is effectuated and enforced. 
  
 76 Fukuyama, F.: The End of History and the Last Man. New York. 1992. 
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 Yet, it is important for us to see here that whatever we identified as bipolarity 
in the way the European Union’s legal system is structured, carries relevance 
exclusively from the perspective of legal imputation/ascription, referencing, 
and (validity-)enforcing; but it has no real existence in terms of the sociological, 
and neither does it have an independent existence discernible from a disciplinal 
perspective of the theory of power/officialdom. Since just as in the League of 
Nations or in the United Nations, it is the aggregate of the constitutive member 
states that is the actor in acting in the name and through the institutional 
system of the given international entity (showing that multiplicity had by then 
been transformed into a common will), this has been observed as happening 
the same way in the history of the evolution of the European community thus 
far. While whatever is produced as European law in the regulatory or adjudicatory 
institutions of Brussels, Strasbourg or Luxembourg provides the foundation for a 
legally independent source of validity, one that, nevertheless, has no existence 
without the constitutive states. Not only because (legally) there would be no 
entity on the receiving end, but also because whatever even actually does appear 
as European law could not (sociologically) be forged without them. It is merely 
as consequence of the series of its establishing treaties that we can even talk 
about the existence of the European Union, of its institutional system, of 
citizenship expressing inclusion therein, and of any other. While the operative 
character of the nation state is a sociological reality, the European communal 
conglomeration of national operations is just a legal derivation and reference, 
a normatively treated conceptual web, in which the only additional reality is 
represented by the presence of conformity (the bare fact that conduct is in 
functional correlation with the posited), and behind it, it is the ideology of 
being European that represents an additional psyche, which can be described 
as prevailing (since it lands itself to being described as operational). While the 
Union’s administration, its activity as a unit is just the treaty-based projection 
of a given grouping of national entities, however, lacking anything that was not 
already present in the composing national frameworks. We have all contributed 
to the construction of its buildings, it was us who recruited its functionaries, 
we continue to provide its funding. It, thusly, has nothing beyond what is ours. 
Its projections too are just whatever we ourselves have transferred to it via 
empowerment provided by our association. So it is the wholeness as a relative 
total manifested in them, each and every consent and fulfilled desire, in a peculiar 
transformed state, once the compromises reached as a result of cooperation allow 
it. And this is so even if, as result of the neophyte attraction of our time we 
can now locate a growing number of individuals in Brussels, in Strasbourg or 
in Luxembourg, as well as in international law offices who–due to having been 
artificially programmed or because of a personal conviction–are loyal or attached 
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to no nation, but to the entity that generates they themselves: the European Union. 
Their individual-psyche, however, is no ontological category until such a func-
tioning psyche does not manifest as a force exerting palpable influence on our 
social existence, that is, until it does not appear as an independent social factor. 
 However, the ontological significance and practical exclusivity of the member 
state status grants a practically exclusive significance to the only possible forms, 
intensity and effectiveness of national participatio, that is, the optimality 
measured against the given nation’s wiggle room in the framework of all players. 
 Consequently, all nations have to plan their path with conscious preparatory 
groundwork, including the forms and methods they wish to rely on when 
attempting to influence community life, while taking into account all that has 
already transpired in terms of strategies and tactics applied successfully/un-
successfully within the dynamics of the total structure, and also regarding 
theoretical and procedural methods, value and interest related trends, and ways 
of national adaptation and implementation; doing all this by way of conducting 
prudent comparative studies (applying criteria such as whether or not the particular 
instance under scrutiny was a singular or historically proven solution, while 
also paying attention to identifying what are and are not the established 
notions of nationhood and tradition in the European sphere of argumentation). 
Naturally, as a feature of national participation, member states represent them-
selves in the European Union based in part on their successive governments, 
and in part by their representation in the European Parliament, the nature of 
which in any given term is also determined, although indirectly, by the political 
makeup of their national legislative body. And regardless of how deep the 
domestic political divisions may be in this respect, these two national sides 
obviously must–using a term borrowed from Lukács once again–manifest in a 
tendential (as in governed by a common trend) unity, otherwise it is inevitable 
that the common national interest will suffer as result of their pugnacious and 
narrow-minded approach missing the big picture. 
 And this sheds a particularly important light on the phenomenon we tend 
to refer to as phase-lag in our own Central and Eastern European legal 
universe as an inherited piece of reality surviving from the Socialist political 
system, which we have been forced to endure. In particular, this means that 
since WWII we have not been able to get to know directly, and consequently 
have not been able to familiarise ourselves with, and master the connected 
practical skills related to certain significant developments that have occurred 
in Western European and Atlantic law, as well as in the legal implementation 
of natively (directly) societal considerations (such as the use of referring to 
natural law by taking into consideration “the nature of things”; the argumen-
tation and persuasion resting on principles and stipulated clauses; the speech 
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in terms of human rights and with the constitutionalisation of issues; and the 
open contest of values that are to be safeguarded (based on weighing the one 
against the other); similarly to how have been left out of the changes that have 
occurred in terms of how the juridical function has evolved from being a mere 
dispenser of official pronouncements to being the venue and tool of resolving 
multiplayer societal problems.77 
 And the inexorable conclusion arising from this is that from the trichotomous 
typology of premodern and modern followed by postmodern outlined earlier, 
the potential carried by the latter, i.e., the postmodernism’s instrumentality, 
has essentially remained unused in the juridical practice of formerly Socialist 
Central and Eastern European member states. Consequently, our room for play 
has been limited to however much is afforded by modernity, which obviously 
results in our relative uncompetitiveness, which is a sort of innate handicap on 
the common European legal marketplace. So until such time that we will have 
reached a state of complete equality of methodology, we shall continue to be 
the cause of the limited nature of our own effectiveness and curtail the 
protection of our national interest, or we can be the (indirect) cause of these 
efforts being limited (or perhaps even practically defeated) by exterior forces. 
 
 
6. Conclusions for the European Law as Practiced 
 
6.1. The Ethos of the Tasks 
 
If, and to the extent, our strategy followed so far has been determined by 
unconditional integration–as if the lack of such total integration would 
prevent us from enjoying the desired benefits of our new member state status–
then (after the initial years of “junior” membership spent rehearsing our new 
role) we will inevitably have to supplement this view and bring it to a more 
sophisticated state, and then we have to organically reintegrate it into this new 
totality, by way of doing prudent work in particularly significant areas, such 
as the channels, procedures, methods and routines of protecting national 
interests. Above all, we would be well advised to get proficient at the new 
culture of sensibility, the command of which frees us from the tie of what is 
otherwise an unavoidable necessity of the legally consequential, and whereby, 
instead of a straight subordination, we could also engage in a practical dialogue 
therewith, and thusly maximise its potential advantages, and, at the same time, 
minimise certain of its aspects that may hic et nunc appear disadvantageous 
  
 77 For these new forms, ways and paths, cf., by the author. ‘Meeting Points…’ (2003). 
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for us, or in the best case scenario, whereby we could turn it into the source of 
newly discovered advantages (using it as a sort of anabasis, as in the Greek 
dramas). 
 Because behind all that, in general, we find the internal intellectual struggle 
of the European legal thinking of our time–namely, for example: the dilemma, 
significance and stake, and even the sheer likelihood of convergence of the 
Continental and the Anglo-Saxon approach to legal regulation; the interrelation 
of the national-domestic and the intra-European international; the details of 
(voluntary and involuntary forms of) legal harmonisation and the chance for 
common codification; the contest of the various national heritages and their 
respective fixed “styles” both in common juridical work and in the creation of 
a new legal tradition; and also the way in which a par excellence independent 
and genuinely European legal scholarship can develop; and finally, based on 
which the designing of the internal structure and the generation of the 
substance of a European legal education has been occurring (along the line of 
the equivalency criteria)78–manifested in an (internal) contest, which–although 
occurring hidden in the shadow of the abstract regime of academic juris-
prudence–is, in a final evaluation, a field of competitive struggle. Yet, we would 
be well-advised to be cognisant of the fact that, even on the marketplace of 
doctrines it is not merely the ideas themselves that are on offer; the issue of 
whether or not they are destined to eventually become widely recognised and 
accepted as consensual concepts is dependent on their overall depth (sophisti-
cation of their background), which is obviously a feature of exclusive privilege, 
afforded only to those national entities that have larger and more robust scientific 
institutions, and also, behind this, on the power of the familiar, the habitual, 
and also that of (special) interest covertly/indirectly reinforcing these longitudinal 
constants almost unnoticeably generating a sensation of comfort, as the 
foundational discussions themselves are also “for the most part, firmly based 
in national and local contexts”.79 
 
6.2. For Reaching an Own Future, Thanks to Own Efforts 
 
Because, as we could see, the European colossus currently referred to as the 
Union is being building in the hope of putting the enormous energy potential 
of our continent to use, in what appears to be an unprecedentedly liberated 
  
 78 Exactly such topics are treated by the author’s Jogrendszerek, jogi gondolkodás-
módok… op. cit. 
 79 Cotterrell: op. cit. 158 in re of debates on European constitution making, remarking 
that no genuinely ‘European’ opinion could be heard then. 
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new European intellectual sphere, which has been ridded, so to speak, of 
historical and national restrictions. So the key players continue to be the still 
fallible historical particularities, since it is not spiritual ideals leading the way, 
rather we are still guided by the same old familiar actors, namely statehoods 
which have previously ended up fighting (by choice) or having to fight (due to 
the external will of other forces) many wars in the name of protecting their 
individual interests during their millennia of common history. Consequently, 
their separate interests even now continue to be identified in their own self, 
regardless of the fact that now these happen to be wrapped (sublimated) in 
the encapsulation format designated by the community life identified as the 
“European Union”. What used to be a bloody conventional physical battle 
fought with arms has by now reached–at least in its appearances, on the surface–
the more (post)modern, currently acceptable form of democratic participation, 
while the whole dynamics have, not surprisingly, remained unchanged, and it 
is still a battle of interests that is the immediate context of this reality. 
 These interests are largely national. Yet now these can be neutralised, 
altered, or rebalanced/reconstituted by local and regional (including cross-
border regional, in the case neighbouring states) interests, which, from time to 
time, are even capable of circumventing/substituting/overtaking that which 
would otherwise not have appropriate form if attempted to be formulated from 
(within) the regular framework of nationhood. Beyond the tipping point, these 
traditionally structured interests (characterised as partial, fragmented, or 
particular) can easily find themselves on the polar opposite of the critical mass 
of these newly constituted gravitational centres; and these characteristically 
global-economic trends of cosmopolitan pervasion focused on global empire-
building aspirations and the amassing of wealth, which by now have occupied 
a position antithetical to the once Westphalian achievement, and propose a 
future for Europe that is going to surpass the notion of nation-statehood (as a 
way of existence defined as the one distinguished from the inter-nationalist 
way)–doing all this under the pretext of advancing integration, but also (and in 
reality) under the spell of a bureaucratic (decision-making) powerhouse of a 
superpower, envisioning a comfortably conducive environment for the effective 
control of preferred market positions; doing all of this on a heap of rubble that 
had in its previous state been the democratic ideal (now rendered the democratic 
deficit), and the social concern that had once upon a time also been a basic 
promise, and as such, potential of the envisaged Europe. 
 Legal cultures are standing side-by-side in this complex. In legal terms, 
nation by nation they are all–individually–equal as member states, yet their 
chance of survival (i.e., their potential for either gaining further strength or losing 
significance altogether) in a historical sense, is measured by their ability to 
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exert influence based on their innovating power.80 Whatever academic pathos 
surrounds the guesswork involved in attempting to size up the chance of 
European continental Civil Law and Anglo-Saxon Common Law traditions 
eventually fusing or continuing to exist side-by-side, the prospect of convergence, 
obviously, shall not be determined by its internal factors, rather it will be the 
net result of the individual abilities for survival, the outcome of the battle of 
competing intellects pitched against each other. The preparatory work of the 
harmonisation and codification of European common law is registered by its 
cultivators everywhere as academic research, in abstract vehicles, under the 
aegis of the principle of the universality-concept of science; while and at the 
same time we must also recognise that these processes occur in reality as 
vehicles of the direct application of legal methodologies, skills and usages, and 
value systems native to national background cultures, that is, as inherent part 
of, or serving the cause of, national expansion. Finally, the particular nation 
states are not merely recipients and ultimate interpreters of the central case-
law produced as the output of European juridical work, but additionally–
through their strategic and tactical choices applied to their official commentaries 
and preliminary questions and inquiries submitted–they themselves can 
potentially become participants in, or even movers of the processes, and thusly 
the constituent determinants of the future of the community. 
 This is because the Union’s Europe is about dynamism. For almost at least 
two decades we have been witnessing what is apparently the relentless seething 
of a laboratorie vivant fed by a certain jacobinisme activism.81 In this process 
we have the decisive force of the raison économique driving integration, 
which is supplemented, as raison symbolique, by other features as well, which 
are all derived and adopted from the spirit of the times, as, for example, the 
case may be with human rights in our situation, which in this scenario are 
serving as the background for the body of rules governing free trade and the 
free movement of goods, that is, features that function as props on the stage 
arranged according to the requirements of postmodern democracy.82 And let us 
not miss the point that both of these legal tiers directly effect our future: they 
hold the key to what is the true meaning of our membership in the European 
Union, thusly they have a lot to do with the chain of consequences defining 
  
 80 To note: in the posthumous Towards the Ontology of Social Being by Lukács, social 
existence presumes the ability and factuality of exerting influence in the social total 
complex. 
 81 Arnaud: op. cit. 293. 
 82 Ibid. p. 294. 
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the framework of our life. For–as termed by one of the past presidents of the 
European Court–„Qui participe à la Communauté épouse son droit”.83 
 So the final outcome of our analysis is that there is no natively European law. 
So far we have member state nations, and currently it is only their cyclically 
renewed consensus (which is ideally reached via mutual compromise) that can 
produce the European law. They can do this in a community of nations in 
which each and every participant is nominally equal. Yet in practice, however, 
their particular size, economic wealth, and, last but not least, their level of 
sophistication in terms of being cultured (well versed, fluent) in the ways of 
Europe renders (promotes or demotes) them players with differing chances 
of success amid the continuity of challenges and contests. Their skilfulness, 
endurance, focus, and tactical affinity are being tested all the time. There are 
of course no losers per se, only players whose interests are forced from the 
fore. Those statehoods and nations behind them are destined for such less 
favourable track, which have proved to be less proactive in terms of keeping 
even their own dynamism alive. Or, it proves to be true and concludable in all 
its feasible directions to claim that “If the »new legal order« is to have reality 
and full meaning it cannot be simply the extension of any one constituent system 
to a broader field of application.”84 Instead, what we have here is the sum total 
of all parts, wherein only that gets included which had previously been released 
into the common stream of the common procedure with appropriate care and 
determination.85 
 
 
 
  
 83 From the speech of President Robert Lecourt (1967–1976) in celebration of the 20th 
year of the Declaration by Robert Schuman in Brussels on 5 May 1970. 
 84 Mitchell, J. D. B.: British Law and British Membership. Europarecht 6 (1971) 97–
118 at 98. 
 85 A research partly carried out and translated thanks to and within the Project K62382 
financed by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund. 
